No downtime is expected, but site performance may be temporarily impacted. Refworks Account Login. Open Collections. UBC Theses and Dissertations. Featured Collection. It is argued that Maududi recognized the inability of any coherent group of people to create such a national vision.
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No downtime is expected, but site performance may be temporarily impacted. Refworks Account Login. Open Collections. UBC Theses and Dissertations. Featured Collection. It is argued that Maududi recognized the inability of any coherent group of people to create such a national vision. In his view, this is compounded by — and in many ways the impetus for — ideological conflict in Muslim countries resulting from an inability to realize the Divine Will.
That is, for Maududi, this was a theological issue as much as it was a quest for peace and coherence in the nascent nation-state of Pakistan in which he was writing. This vision imposed on both Muslims and non-Muslims in the Muslim world by both banning calls to implement Divine Law, and by forcing non-Muslims into second-hand citizen status. These spheres would remove claims to national objectivity hidden under the special interests and personal biases of legislators.
Pakistan and Maududi Secular Versus Divine Authority Dealing with Difference in the Islamic State Faith and Power The Limits of Faith and Power The Economic System I also express my deep gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Mark Warren, who reviewed multiple versions of my thesis and made it possible for me to attend the doctoral program of my choice. He, along with Arjun Chowdhury, guided me through the chaos of academia to discover my true passion, which I will be taking to pursue my doctoral studies, helping me every step of the way.
Perhaps the most important of these changes was the demise of the Ottoman Empire in , which once served as a symbol of unity among Muslims around the globe, sending the political component of Muslim identity into ideological disarray. In light of these political events, many had taken it upon themselves to redefine what it meant to be Muslim in the era of the modern nation-state.
While the conflict during the period of decolonization of the Muslim world is often portrayed to be one of ideological battle — perhaps 1 Maududi was born into a privileged reformist family in Aurangabad, British India in After breaking with the Congress Party as well as opposing the Muslim League, Maududi founded the Jamaat Islami in after gaining supporters during his tenure as manager of a trust waqf owned by supporters of the Muslim League. The nation-state, with all of its coercive capabilities, modern technology, and a standardization of the concept of a productive citizen through years of government training, was brand new to Islamic thought.
To date, unfortunately, very little research has been undertaken to study the relationship between Islamic identity and the implementation of law in contemporary, Muslim-majority countries, although there are a number of notable exceptions.
Maududi was one of these thinkers, and pointed out 2 Both traditional and reform movements calling for new ideological and political solutions to the problems experienced under colonial and post-colonial government in both the Arab World and the Subcontinent.
Perhaps one of the strongest movements which remains in force until today is the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by Hassan al-Banna in in response to a number of political factors, including providing an Islamic alternative to British rule which controlled Egyptian political affairs even after , and reconstituting a pan-Islamic vision after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in Which is to say, still briefly though emphatically, that the capabilities of political power to produce subjectivities that would recognize themselves in that power did not exist.
The main one is the formation of a national identity and consequential homogenization of religious minorities, and even Muslims themselves, by the basis of their solidarity with the nation-state — the ideology that undergirds statism. This statist ideology is fundamentally anti-Islamic, Maududi argues, because of its borrowing of institutions respective colonial masters; not necessarily for that reason, but because these institutions fundamentally oppose government conducive to the Divine Law.
Maududi asks the question of whether or not it is possible to introduce government that both looks after the needs of Muslims and non-Muslim minorities.
For Maududi, although this state attempts to correct the existential dilemma of the Muslim population, there needs to be a 4 reconsideration of the potential political implications of such a solution, including the possibility of further oppression and bloodshed resulting from the inability to accurately solve the predicament of the ummah.
As such, this thesis also engages with a number of critical political theorists who have studied and critiqued the nation-state, arguing that both Muslim- and non-Muslim-majority states systematically exclude and homogenize minority populations under the guise of neutrality and public order, both Muslim and non-Muslim identities are reinvented by the legal system. While this applies to many Muslim minorities in Europe, it is also used as an example of how majoritarian values suppress non-Muslim minorities in Muslim-majority nation-states.
I will then show how this conception of the state is systematically rejected by Maududi, who I maintain has sustained one of the few but effective critiques against the notion of modern nation-state. Introduction In conceptualizing the modern nation-state, there are a number of its attributes, both physical and conceptual, which need to be identified before their relationships can be analyzed. It entails a very brief differentiation between a number of connected concepts: state power, or the exercise of coercive power over a defined territory; the continued establishment of order through legislating and interpretation of the law; majoritarian ideals; and liberal rights, which despite limited application, define the identity of modern nation-states.
While it is important not to confuse these different concepts, it is necessary to identify the ways in which they often correspond to each-other.
The first and main problem, which allow us to examine the various other components of the nation-state including the population , is the concept of the secular. Distinguished from various secularist ideologies e. The purpose of the nation-state, being a necessary consequence of modernity, thus, is to negotiate between the different discourses within the secular — and the ability to establish this through the power of the state, whether it be the will of the majority in the parliament, or sensibilities of another legislator or interpreter of the law who is given the right to define the secular, precisely for the purpose of maintaining control over the population.
This is to say that the different concepts stated in the first paragraph are interconnected by necessity in the modern nation-state — or at least those under question in this thesis Muslim-majority countries.
The survival of the state itself is its highest goal, pursued by all branches of government regardless of the existence of a separation of powers. Of course, this distinction or justification is made in countries with 6 In an informative legal study, Elizabeth Magill discusses a number of issues that undergird the supposed understanding that power is neatly organized into executive, judicial, and legislative power with their respective branches. See also: Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H.
Pildes, "Separation of parties, not powers," Harvard Law Review : , esp. Hallaq comments on these sources as well: Hallaq, The Impossible State, This is true regardless of whether or not we view them genuine applications of liberal human rights, for the reason that balancing minority human rights with the collective good, for instance, is a task of all judiciaries regardless of its specific historical origin.
That being said, the specific historical origin and particular values that embody the state and its population play a role in both legislation and interpretation of the law, while our sensibilities may determine them either as reasonable e. It is precisely this interplay between the legislature, the courts, the state ideology, and their ability to determine the place of religion in the public sphere, that is the concern of Maududi and at the core of his critique of the nation-state.
This will all be detailed in due course. A helpful example is Canada, where religious and linguistic difference was viewed as a threat to the health of the liberal society itself, and thus required forced assimilation of the French Catholic minority to instill the spirit of cooperation among members of society as proposed by Lord Durham in his infamous Report on the Affairs of British North America.
In the Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt identifies the focal point of the role of the nation-state in guaranteeing human rights. Regardless of the level of toleration and the desire to avoid those very parochial principles like race, nation, and language as defining aspects of any healthy polity liberal or not , there must nonetheless be fundamental principles that serve as the bedrock for societal organization be it legislation, the public sphere, etc.
The awkwardness arises from the fact that there are substantial numbers of people who are citizens and also belong to the culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries. The challenge is to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles.
Gutmann Ed. This is a fundamentally important point to understand for the argument of this thesis, and has been perpetuated and extended in both European and post-colonial, Muslim-majority nation-states. Of course, I do not intend in this section to provide a critique of the nation-state or the various attempts to salvage the majority-minority rift, but rather to point out the existence of this problem to begin with.
I will now show how this is a problem which specifically concerns the judicial branch of the state and its ability to interpret rights in a way that legislates using the justification of public order. That there is a necessary reflection of majoritarian values — even if not reflected through actual tyranny of the majority in a legislative body for example — in the government, and that these values necessitate and maintain the dominance of the nation-state over its citizens is important to understand, and builds on the brief problematic defined in Section 1.
For this thesis, it is the way in which legislation and judicial decisions effect the practice and regulation of religion. She documents many examples of women, for example, who struggle on a daily basis to convince those around them that their right to religious practice in the form of wearing a headscarf—which is illegal in schools—is worth defending.
Although Muslim girls and other religious students would no longer be able to express their beliefs in certain ways as a result of the law, proponents of the ban argued that they would nonetheless remain free to believe whatever they wanted to believe, exercising their right to conscience … Significantly, then, proponents of the law did not contend that religious liberties must sometimes be curtailed in the name of public order; rather, they did not see the ban on headscarves and other religious signs as an attack on religious liberty at all.
The second way in which this is possible is noted by Saba Mahmood and Hussein Agrama in their separate studies of the Egyptian judicial system;19 the concept of public order, or the fact that the state is able to curtail individual liberties for the purpose of maintaining public order, is used in the regulation of all religious practitioners, ranging from Muslims to Christians and Bahais. Fernando, The Republic Unsettled, Analysis of Muslim-Majority States in the Post-Colonial Context I hope to have identified the problem of the majority-minority tension as a problem of the nation-state.
I will now direct this paper towards understanding how this system of legislation and legal interpretation was carried over to Muslim-majority states in the 20th century. Let us consider a number of such states; say, Egypt, Turkey, and Sudan.
Turkey is a case in point. Turam ed. So far, through a sort of dialectical method, I have attempted to establish the following point: that the current political institutions of Muslim countries—borrowing from their former colonial masters—create states that essentially use or include historical Islamic majoritarian principles in order to uphold state sovereignty through a combination of popular sovereignty and judicial power. Dahlab was a school teacher in: Ibid, Pakistan and Maududi It is now necessary to consider the nascent, post-colonial state of Pakistan that Maududi was writing in and proposing constitutional amendments to — and its fitting with the model of the nation-state along with its associated problems.
While it is not possible to give a summary of the its creation and will thus not venture into the subject, I hope to establish a number of principles before comparing it to the previous states.
Its attempt to train the latter toward a higher set of passions is in line with the work of the aesthetic science since its inauguration.
Paula R. Newberg, Judging the state: courts and constitutional politics in Pakistan Cambridge University Press, , It is hard to miss, once again, the resolving of the conflict between secular power of the nation-state and private interests e.
Martin E. Marty and R. Saeed argues on the basis that the language against the Ahmadi community, among Muslim right-wing and secular organizations 41 Sadia Saeed, "Pakistani nationalism and the state marginalisation of the Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan," Studies in ethnicity and nationalism 7, no.
One example of this disruption of public order is documented in opposing testimonies concerning the May 29th fight that broke out between Muslim and Ahmadi students. I will draw from a number of sources, but mainly a collection of essays and lectures manifested in the compiled book, Islamic Law and Constitution, which has been translated from Urdu to English. Maududi wrote the preface of the the 2nd edition of the translation and personally approved the translation.
As such, I suffice at providing a strictly legal definition of the sovereignty. There are reasons to believe that this was not always the case, but it is the paradigm Maududi operates in and refers to in the Sunnah and early historical records. It is thus the pure convincing power of the more legally acceptable argument,58 not individual qualifications, legal restrictions, or obedience to the state powers that defines what laws should be decreed.
The entire Muslim population runs the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of his Prophet … that is to say divine democratic government, because under it citizens have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive … is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who also have the right to depose it. Maududi goes so far as to pre-empt scholars of deliberative democracy e.
Dealing with Difference in the Islamic State In the second chapter, nearly all of the scholars I have referred to have expressed the significance of minorities in secular nation-states. Minority rights and the negotiation that takes place within this secular space often becomes controversial when it comes to treating minority populations, who differ from the majoritarian norm upon which the nation-state is founded.
Whether or not they are done so to the point of breakage, or are sacrificed as you put it, is, in my mind, a theological question and I leave such questions to theologians. What I can say as a social scientist, however, is that Sudanese Islamist thinkers like many other Islamist thinkers did not think so and sincerely tried to think through a state based on their reading of the Islamic sources.
While there is not enough space to discuss the concept in detail, it would suffice to say that the system—as defined by Maududi—essentially strips minority populations from citizenship in the sense that they cannot participate in legislation of Islamic law. They are entitled to demand the enforcement of their own Code in their personal matters and this demand of theirs must be accepted. Maududi hopes to provide a satisfactory answer in a essay on the difference between secular and Islamic governance concerning minorities.
In fact, it shows that he was cognizant of the various problems concerning the treatment of minorities in nation-states.
Abul A'la Maududi
He was the founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami , the then largest Islamic organisation in Asia. He has been the second person in history whose absentee funeral was observed in the Kaaba , succeeding King Ashama ibn-Abjar. Maududi was born in the city of Aurangabad in colonial India , then part of the princely state enclave of Hyderabad. He was the youngest of three sons of Ahmad Hasan, a lawyer by profession. Although his father was only middle-class, he was the descendant of the Chishti ; in fact his last name was derived from the first member of the Chishti Silsilah, i. Until he was nine, Maududi "received religious nurture at the hands of his father and from a variety of teachers employed by him. When he was eleven, Maududi was admitted to eighth class directly in Madrasa Fawqaniyya Mashriqiyya Oriental High School , Aurangabad , founded by Shibli Nomani , a modernist Islamic scholar trying to synthesize traditional Islamic scholarship with modern knowledge, and which awakened Maududi's long-lasting interest in philosophy particularly from Thomas Arnold , who also taught the same subject to Muhammad Iqbal as well as natural sciences , like mathematics , physics and chemistry.
Islamic Law and Constitution